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Abstract
This article describes a quantum bit commitment protocol, QBC3,
based on entanglement destruction via forced measurements and proves
its unconditional security. Some comments on the current status of
the field are also made.
1 Introduction
It is nearly universally accepted that unconditionally secure quantum bit
commitment (QBC) is impossible. For a summary of the problem, its brief
history and further references, see [1, 2]. In the following, my current view
of the field is summarized and a new secure protocol, QBC3, is presented
together with a sketch of the security proof.
2 The Impossibility Proof
The general claim of impossibility was made in ref. [3, 4] and criticized in
some detail in [1] and [5]. In my current understanding, there are two major
gaps in the arguments supporting such claims. The first is the assumption
1
that all use of (classical) randomness in the protocol can be purified via
quantum entanglement that results in an openly known pure state for the
parties A and B. The second is that any quantum measurement specified in
the middle of protocol execution can be postponed to the end of commitment
just before opening. These two points are related, and both connected to the
implicit assumption that entanglement can be formed and maintained to just
before opening.
The first assumption is clearly false by noting that entanglement has to
end at some point, at which the entanglement basis and probabilities can
still be determined by random numbers. Such numbers may be physically
generated classically or quantum mechanically, say by throwing a die or het-
erodyning the vacuum. They are needed in many classical and all quantum
cryptographic protocols. There is no need for the basis and probabilities to
be known to the other party if his/her security is not affected – we have
codified this as the Secrecy Principle [5, 1]. In particular, this does not vi-
olate the Kerckhoff’s Principle, which states that the adversary is presumed
to know the structure of the protocol in cryptography. On the other hand,
the ”community” somehow thinks there is a violation according to ref. [2].
Similar to the first, the second assumption is true in various types of
protocols but not all. The crucial point is whether the relevant entanglement
that is responsible for successful cheating by either A or B can be created or
can remain effective after measurement in the middle of a protocol.
I have insisted, since the beginning in 2000, that a priori there can be no
general impossibility proof without mathematically representing a common
characteristic of all QBC protocols, which has never been given. As Ozawa
put it, nobody calls the Church-Turing thesis the Church-Turing Conjecture
or Theorem, because there is no mathematical definition of a mechanical
procedure. It is difficult to understand on what basis one can claim to have
a completely general impossibility theorem, as allegedly maintained by the
vast majority of the ‘community’ at present [2]. Apparently, much remains
to be written to explain just this point.
3 Exploiting Gaps in the Impossibility Proof
There have been many attempts by different authors to produce protocols
that lie outside the impossibility proof formulation. Even when successful, a
secure protocol has not been created except my QBC1 [1]. My own attempts
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are summarized in Appendix A of [1] and will be updated in the future. One
of the reasons that error is easily committed in the QBC problem is concep-
tual – how one should represent certain given physical action mathematically.
Indeed, I believe this act/math correspondence is a fruitful area for future
exploration that would not only lead to a more systematic understanding of
all possible protocol formulations and attacks in QBC, but in the foundation
of quantum physics generally.
More general proofs of impossibility relaxing the first assumption have
been given by Ozawa [6] and Cheung [7] independently, and also by D‘Ariano
etc [2] in an algebraic formulation that has not been translated into the
standard form. While it is claimed in [2] that their formulation covers all my
previous protocols, it is not true for QBC1.
4 Protocol QBC3
My current QBC3 is similar to a previous QBC3 I had that is not secure,
its security now derives from an added feature from B’s checking before
opening which forces A to make a measurement that destroys his cheating
entanglement. Consider the following protocol: B sends A a sequence of n
qubits, each randomly in one of the four BB84 states |jl〉, je ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
named by its position in the sequence. A randomly picks one, modulates
it by U0 = R(π/16) or U1 = R(−π/16), rotation by ±π/16 on the great
circle containing {|j〉} depending on b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends it back to B as
commitment. A opens by sending back the rest and revealing everything.
This is a typical preliminary protocol in that it is at best ǫ-concealing with
A’s optimum cheating probability not correspondingly close to 1, so that
in a sequence of such action a single bit can be committed that is both
ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding. For definitions and terminology, see [1].
This protocol was first given as an anonymous state protocol in which B
entangles her randomness with arbitrary probability and basis, but it was
found, as asserted above, that A’s cheating transformation is actually inde-
pendent of such information. There are many ways for A to entangle and it is
claimed in [2] that the one with the minimum ancilla state-space dimension
is as good as any [2]. Let |l〉 ∈ HA be the entanglement ancilla states, P
the cyclic shift unitary operator on n qubits, P n = I. Let us first assume A
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entangles in this minimal way,
|Ψb〉 = Ub 1√
n
n∑
ℓ=1
|ℓ〉 ⊗ P ℓ|j1〉...|jn〉 (1)
where |j1〉 is acted on by Ub. The protocol can be shown to be ǫ - concealing
similar to the proof given in ref [8], and A can locally turn |Ψ0〉 to |Ψ1〉 near
perfectly.
Consider the following addition to the protocol. Before opening, B asks
A to send back a fraction λ, say λ = 1
2
, of the n qubits chosen randomly
by B for checking. One can choose n large enough so that n
2
is long enough
for the ǫ concealing level. If A claims that fraction contains the committed
one, B would ask to check the remaining 1 − λ fraction instead. Assuming,
as usual, that A must open one bit value perfectly, A would have to answer
B’s checks perfectly. A continuity argument would take care of the general
case. The best he can do is to perform a Luders measurement with con-
trolled swaps on his ancilla HA, projecting into the qubits B picked. If the
checking qubits do not contain the committed qubit from the measurement
result, which is then still entangled with the rest, A succeeds in cheating.
If they do, A would have disentangled the committed qubit from the rest,
and entanglement cheating for A is no longer possible. Indeed, his cheating
success probability is not small, given by 1/2 for λ = 1/2, while the protocol
remains ǫ−concealing. This already contradicts the quantitative conclusion
of the Impossibility Proof, for which A’s cheating probability should be close
to 1. The protocol is extended to be a near-perfect concealing and binding
one, QBC3, as described generally in [1] and [9], by adjusting the following
m→∞ with n/m→∞.
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PROTOCOL QBC3
1. B sends A m segments of n-qubits, each randomly in one of four
BBS4 states.
2. A forms (1) from each segment, modulates the first qubit by the
same Ub = R(±pi/16) and sends back to B these first qubits.
3. B randomly chooses half of the qubits in each segment and asks A to
send them back for checking. If for any segment A claims it contains
the committed one, B asks to check the other half instead.
4. A opens by sending back all qubits and revealing everything; B
verifies.
In the usual Impossibility Proof formulation, an honesty assumption is
made for both parties on their entanglement/state formation in multi-pass
protocols. Thus, the above protocol already shows such proofs are not cor-
rect, even though A can actually cheat with other entanglements than (1).
For checking before commitment, two ways were proposed before to deal
with it quantitatively: by ensemble checking or by a classical game-theoretic
formulation – see the Appendix of ref [10]. It is clear that some decision has
to made on what to do if A or B is found cheating, they cannot be allowed to
go free or they could just keep cheating until they succeed. In the ensemble
checking formulation, the first time a party is found cheating is taken as
failure to cheat in the evaluation of their cheating success probability. For
the game theoretic formulation, a penalty is assigned to each cheat detection
and the total penalty is bounded. Even a single random qubit can be checked
by requiring one party to entangle all the possibilities with the other party
checking the total state. Another approach is to add a “holding phase” [2]
between commitment and opening, during which cheating detection counts as
failure to cheat. Such an approach was used in several of my early checking
protocols [1, 9]. Note that the formulation in ref [2] does not include a
checking action in the holding phase, and it does not include any penalty on
cheat detection. Thus, it does not cover the present 2-pass protocol QBC3
or my old 3-pass QBC1. In particular, with (1) being enforced by A on
the qubits sent back by B, the security proof of QBC1 as outlined in [1] is
completed.
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For QBC3, it is more complicated to check (1) since A already committed,
but it can be done as follows. A would first send his ancilla to B with a
random entanglement basis, then B sends back A’s committed qubit to him
who would turn it back to neutral. That B sends back the correct qubit
can be checked by A via asking B to send in all the states in her possession
for A to verify. Then A sends back all qubits to B who can now check (1).
This sequence can be carried out in either the ensemble or game-theoretic
formulation. In this way, a relatively simple but complete proof has been
given.
5 Conclusion
A protocol QBC3 with checking has been given that clearly lies outside the
formulation of all the impossibility proofs. Apart from spelling out the de-
tails, all the essential elements for a complete security proof for QBC3 have
been described.
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